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FreeBSD hs32.drive.ne.jp 9.1-RELEASE FreeBSD 9.1-RELEASE #1: Wed Jan 14 12:18:08 JST 2015 root@hs32.drive.ne.jp:/sys/amd64/compile/hs32 amd64 |
| Current File : //sys/amd64/compile/hs32/modules/usr/src/sys/modules/libalias/modules/irc/@/security/mac/mac_framework.c |
/*-
* Copyright (c) 1999-2002, 2006, 2009 Robert N. M. Watson
* Copyright (c) 2001 Ilmar S. Habibulin
* Copyright (c) 2001-2005 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
* Copyright (c) 2005-2006 SPARTA, Inc.
* Copyright (c) 2008-2009 Apple Inc.
* All rights reserved.
*
* This software was developed by Robert Watson and Ilmar Habibulin for the
* TrustedBSD Project.
*
* This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project in part by Network
* Associates Laboratories, the Security Research Division of Network
* Associates, Inc. under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"),
* as part of the DARPA CHATS research program.
*
* This software was enhanced by SPARTA ISSO under SPAWAR contract
* N66001-04-C-6019 ("SEFOS").
*
* This software was developed at the University of Cambridge Computer
* Laboratory with support from a grant from Google, Inc.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/*-
* Framework for extensible kernel access control. This file contains core
* kernel infrastructure for the TrustedBSD MAC Framework, including policy
* registration, versioning, locking, error composition operator, and system
* calls.
*
* The MAC Framework implements three programming interfaces:
*
* - The kernel MAC interface, defined in mac_framework.h, and invoked
* throughout the kernel to request security decisions, notify of security
* related events, etc.
*
* - The MAC policy module interface, defined in mac_policy.h, which is
* implemented by MAC policy modules and invoked by the MAC Framework to
* forward kernel security requests and notifications to policy modules.
*
* - The user MAC API, defined in mac.h, which allows user programs to query
* and set label state on objects.
*
* The majority of the MAC Framework implementation may be found in
* src/sys/security/mac. Sample policy modules may be found in
* src/sys/security/mac_*.
*/
#include "opt_kdtrace.h"
#include "opt_mac.h"
#include <sys/cdefs.h>
__FBSDID("$FreeBSD: release/9.1.0/sys/security/mac/mac_framework.c 230167 2012-01-15 21:58:51Z avg $");
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/systm.h>
#include <sys/condvar.h>
#include <sys/kernel.h>
#include <sys/lock.h>
#include <sys/mac.h>
#include <sys/module.h>
#include <sys/rmlock.h>
#include <sys/sdt.h>
#include <sys/sx.h>
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#include <security/mac/mac_framework.h>
#include <security/mac/mac_internal.h>
#include <security/mac/mac_policy.h>
/*
* DTrace SDT providers for MAC.
*/
SDT_PROVIDER_DEFINE(mac);
SDT_PROVIDER_DEFINE(mac_framework);
SDT_PROBE_DEFINE2(mac, kernel, policy, modevent, modevent, "int",
"struct mac_policy_conf *mpc");
SDT_PROBE_DEFINE1(mac, kernel, policy, register, register,
"struct mac_policy_conf *");
SDT_PROBE_DEFINE1(mac, kernel, policy, unregister, unregister,
"struct mac_policy_conf *");
/*
* Root sysctl node for all MAC and MAC policy controls.
*/
SYSCTL_NODE(_security, OID_AUTO, mac, CTLFLAG_RW, 0,
"TrustedBSD MAC policy controls");
/*
* Declare that the kernel provides MAC support, version 3 (FreeBSD 7.x).
* This permits modules to refuse to be loaded if the necessary support isn't
* present, even if it's pre-boot.
*/
MODULE_VERSION(kernel_mac_support, MAC_VERSION);
static unsigned int mac_version = MAC_VERSION;
SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, version, CTLFLAG_RD, &mac_version, 0,
"");
/*
* Labels consist of a indexed set of "slots", which are allocated policies
* as required. The MAC Framework maintains a bitmask of slots allocated so
* far to prevent reuse. Slots cannot be reused, as the MAC Framework
* guarantees that newly allocated slots in labels will be NULL unless
* otherwise initialized, and because we do not have a mechanism to garbage
* collect slots on policy unload. As labeled policies tend to be statically
* loaded during boot, and not frequently unloaded and reloaded, this is not
* generally an issue.
*/
#if MAC_MAX_SLOTS > 32
#error "MAC_MAX_SLOTS too large"
#endif
static unsigned int mac_max_slots = MAC_MAX_SLOTS;
static unsigned int mac_slot_offsets_free = (1 << MAC_MAX_SLOTS) - 1;
SYSCTL_UINT(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, max_slots, CTLFLAG_RD, &mac_max_slots,
0, "");
/*
* Has the kernel started generating labeled objects yet? All read/write
* access to this variable is serialized during the boot process. Following
* the end of serialization, we don't update this flag; no locking.
*/
static int mac_late = 0;
/*
* Each policy declares a mask of object types requiring labels to be
* allocated for them. For convenience, we combine and cache the bitwise or
* of the per-policy object flags to track whether we will allocate a label
* for an object type at run-time.
*/
uint64_t mac_labeled;
SYSCTL_UQUAD(_security_mac, OID_AUTO, labeled, CTLFLAG_RD, &mac_labeled, 0,
"Mask of object types being labeled");
MALLOC_DEFINE(M_MACTEMP, "mactemp", "MAC temporary label storage");
/*
* MAC policy modules are placed in one of two lists: mac_static_policy_list,
* for policies that are loaded early and cannot be unloaded, and
* mac_policy_list, which holds policies either loaded later in the boot
* cycle or that may be unloaded. The static policy list does not require
* locks to iterate over, but the dynamic list requires synchronization.
* Support for dynamic policy loading can be compiled out using the
* MAC_STATIC kernel option.
*
* The dynamic policy list is protected by two locks: modifying the list
* requires both locks to be held exclusively. One of the locks,
* mac_policy_rm, is acquired over policy entry points that will never sleep;
* the other, mac_policy_sx, is acquire over policy entry points that may
* sleep. The former category will be used when kernel locks may be held
* over calls to the MAC Framework, during network processing in ithreads,
* etc. The latter will tend to involve potentially blocking memory
* allocations, extended attribute I/O, etc.
*/
#ifndef MAC_STATIC
static struct rmlock mac_policy_rm; /* Non-sleeping entry points. */
static struct sx mac_policy_sx; /* Sleeping entry points. */
#endif
struct mac_policy_list_head mac_policy_list;
struct mac_policy_list_head mac_static_policy_list;
u_int mac_policy_count; /* Registered policy count. */
static void mac_policy_xlock(void);
static void mac_policy_xlock_assert(void);
static void mac_policy_xunlock(void);
void
mac_policy_slock_nosleep(struct rm_priotracker *tracker)
{
#ifndef MAC_STATIC
if (!mac_late)
return;
rm_rlock(&mac_policy_rm, tracker);
#endif
}
void
mac_policy_slock_sleep(void)
{
WITNESS_WARN(WARN_GIANTOK | WARN_SLEEPOK, NULL,
"mac_policy_slock_sleep");
#ifndef MAC_STATIC
if (!mac_late)
return;
sx_slock(&mac_policy_sx);
#endif
}
void
mac_policy_sunlock_nosleep(struct rm_priotracker *tracker)
{
#ifndef MAC_STATIC
if (!mac_late)
return;
rm_runlock(&mac_policy_rm, tracker);
#endif
}
void
mac_policy_sunlock_sleep(void)
{
#ifndef MAC_STATIC
if (!mac_late)
return;
sx_sunlock(&mac_policy_sx);
#endif
}
static void
mac_policy_xlock(void)
{
WITNESS_WARN(WARN_GIANTOK | WARN_SLEEPOK, NULL,
"mac_policy_xlock()");
#ifndef MAC_STATIC
if (!mac_late)
return;
sx_xlock(&mac_policy_sx);
rm_wlock(&mac_policy_rm);
#endif
}
static void
mac_policy_xunlock(void)
{
#ifndef MAC_STATIC
if (!mac_late)
return;
rm_wunlock(&mac_policy_rm);
sx_xunlock(&mac_policy_sx);
#endif
}
static void
mac_policy_xlock_assert(void)
{
#ifndef MAC_STATIC
if (!mac_late)
return;
/* XXXRW: rm_assert(&mac_policy_rm, RA_WLOCKED); */
sx_assert(&mac_policy_sx, SA_XLOCKED);
#endif
}
/*
* Initialize the MAC subsystem, including appropriate SMP locks.
*/
static void
mac_init(void)
{
LIST_INIT(&mac_static_policy_list);
LIST_INIT(&mac_policy_list);
mac_labelzone_init();
#ifndef MAC_STATIC
rm_init_flags(&mac_policy_rm, "mac_policy_rm", RM_NOWITNESS);
sx_init_flags(&mac_policy_sx, "mac_policy_sx", SX_NOWITNESS);
#endif
}
/*
* For the purposes of modules that want to know if they were loaded "early",
* set the mac_late flag once we've processed modules either linked into the
* kernel, or loaded before the kernel startup.
*/
static void
mac_late_init(void)
{
mac_late = 1;
}
/*
* Given a policy, derive from its set of non-NULL label init methods what
* object types the policy is interested in.
*/
static uint64_t
mac_policy_getlabeled(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc)
{
uint64_t labeled;
#define MPC_FLAG(method, flag) \
if (mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_ ## method != NULL) \
labeled |= (flag); \
labeled = 0;
MPC_FLAG(cred_init_label, MPC_OBJECT_CRED);
MPC_FLAG(proc_init_label, MPC_OBJECT_PROC);
MPC_FLAG(vnode_init_label, MPC_OBJECT_VNODE);
MPC_FLAG(inpcb_init_label, MPC_OBJECT_INPCB);
MPC_FLAG(socket_init_label, MPC_OBJECT_SOCKET);
MPC_FLAG(devfs_init_label, MPC_OBJECT_DEVFS);
MPC_FLAG(mbuf_init_label, MPC_OBJECT_MBUF);
MPC_FLAG(ipq_init_label, MPC_OBJECT_IPQ);
MPC_FLAG(ifnet_init_label, MPC_OBJECT_IFNET);
MPC_FLAG(bpfdesc_init_label, MPC_OBJECT_BPFDESC);
MPC_FLAG(pipe_init_label, MPC_OBJECT_PIPE);
MPC_FLAG(mount_init_label, MPC_OBJECT_MOUNT);
MPC_FLAG(posixsem_init_label, MPC_OBJECT_POSIXSEM);
MPC_FLAG(posixshm_init_label, MPC_OBJECT_POSIXSHM);
MPC_FLAG(sysvmsg_init_label, MPC_OBJECT_SYSVMSG);
MPC_FLAG(sysvmsq_init_label, MPC_OBJECT_SYSVMSQ);
MPC_FLAG(sysvsem_init_label, MPC_OBJECT_SYSVSEM);
MPC_FLAG(sysvshm_init_label, MPC_OBJECT_SYSVSHM);
MPC_FLAG(syncache_init_label, MPC_OBJECT_SYNCACHE);
MPC_FLAG(ip6q_init_label, MPC_OBJECT_IP6Q);
#undef MPC_FLAG
return (labeled);
}
/*
* When policies are loaded or unloaded, walk the list of registered policies
* and built mac_labeled, a bitmask representing the union of all objects
* requiring labels across all policies.
*/
static void
mac_policy_update(void)
{
struct mac_policy_conf *mpc;
mac_policy_xlock_assert();
mac_labeled = 0;
mac_policy_count = 0;
LIST_FOREACH(mpc, &mac_static_policy_list, mpc_list) {
mac_labeled |= mac_policy_getlabeled(mpc);
mac_policy_count++;
}
LIST_FOREACH(mpc, &mac_policy_list, mpc_list) {
mac_labeled |= mac_policy_getlabeled(mpc);
mac_policy_count++;
}
}
static int
mac_policy_register(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc)
{
struct mac_policy_conf *tmpc;
int error, slot, static_entry;
error = 0;
/*
* We don't technically need exclusive access while !mac_late, but
* hold it for assertion consistency.
*/
mac_policy_xlock();
/*
* If the module can potentially be unloaded, or we're loading late,
* we have to stick it in the non-static list and pay an extra
* performance overhead. Otherwise, we can pay a light locking cost
* and stick it in the static list.
*/
static_entry = (!mac_late &&
!(mpc->mpc_loadtime_flags & MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_UNLOADOK));
if (static_entry) {
LIST_FOREACH(tmpc, &mac_static_policy_list, mpc_list) {
if (strcmp(tmpc->mpc_name, mpc->mpc_name) == 0) {
error = EEXIST;
goto out;
}
}
} else {
LIST_FOREACH(tmpc, &mac_policy_list, mpc_list) {
if (strcmp(tmpc->mpc_name, mpc->mpc_name) == 0) {
error = EEXIST;
goto out;
}
}
}
if (mpc->mpc_field_off != NULL) {
slot = ffs(mac_slot_offsets_free);
if (slot == 0) {
error = ENOMEM;
goto out;
}
slot--;
mac_slot_offsets_free &= ~(1 << slot);
*mpc->mpc_field_off = slot;
}
mpc->mpc_runtime_flags |= MPC_RUNTIME_FLAG_REGISTERED;
/*
* If we're loading a MAC module after the framework has initialized,
* it has to go into the dynamic list. If we're loading it before
* we've finished initializing, it can go into the static list with
* weaker locker requirements.
*/
if (static_entry)
LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&mac_static_policy_list, mpc, mpc_list);
else
LIST_INSERT_HEAD(&mac_policy_list, mpc, mpc_list);
/*
* Per-policy initialization. Currently, this takes place under the
* exclusive lock, so policies must not sleep in their init method.
* In the future, we may want to separate "init" from "start", with
* "init" occuring without the lock held. Likewise, on tear-down,
* breaking out "stop" from "destroy".
*/
if (mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_init != NULL)
(*(mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_init))(mpc);
mac_policy_update();
SDT_PROBE(mac, kernel, policy, register, mpc, 0, 0, 0, 0);
printf("Security policy loaded: %s (%s)\n", mpc->mpc_fullname,
mpc->mpc_name);
out:
mac_policy_xunlock();
return (error);
}
static int
mac_policy_unregister(struct mac_policy_conf *mpc)
{
/*
* If we fail the load, we may get a request to unload. Check to see
* if we did the run-time registration, and if not, silently succeed.
*/
mac_policy_xlock();
if ((mpc->mpc_runtime_flags & MPC_RUNTIME_FLAG_REGISTERED) == 0) {
mac_policy_xunlock();
return (0);
}
#if 0
/*
* Don't allow unloading modules with private data.
*/
if (mpc->mpc_field_off != NULL) {
mac_policy_xunlock();
return (EBUSY);
}
#endif
/*
* Only allow the unload to proceed if the module is unloadable by
* its own definition.
*/
if ((mpc->mpc_loadtime_flags & MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_UNLOADOK) == 0) {
mac_policy_xunlock();
return (EBUSY);
}
if (mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_destroy != NULL)
(*(mpc->mpc_ops->mpo_destroy))(mpc);
LIST_REMOVE(mpc, mpc_list);
mpc->mpc_runtime_flags &= ~MPC_RUNTIME_FLAG_REGISTERED;
mac_policy_update();
mac_policy_xunlock();
SDT_PROBE(mac, kernel, policy, unregister, mpc, 0, 0, 0, 0);
printf("Security policy unload: %s (%s)\n", mpc->mpc_fullname,
mpc->mpc_name);
return (0);
}
/*
* Allow MAC policy modules to register during boot, etc.
*/
int
mac_policy_modevent(module_t mod, int type, void *data)
{
struct mac_policy_conf *mpc;
int error;
error = 0;
mpc = (struct mac_policy_conf *) data;
#ifdef MAC_STATIC
if (mac_late) {
printf("mac_policy_modevent: MAC_STATIC and late\n");
return (EBUSY);
}
#endif
SDT_PROBE(mac, kernel, policy, modevent, type, mpc, 0, 0, 0);
switch (type) {
case MOD_LOAD:
if (mpc->mpc_loadtime_flags & MPC_LOADTIME_FLAG_NOTLATE &&
mac_late) {
printf("mac_policy_modevent: can't load %s policy "
"after booting\n", mpc->mpc_name);
error = EBUSY;
break;
}
error = mac_policy_register(mpc);
break;
case MOD_UNLOAD:
/* Don't unregister the module if it was never registered. */
if ((mpc->mpc_runtime_flags & MPC_RUNTIME_FLAG_REGISTERED)
!= 0)
error = mac_policy_unregister(mpc);
else
error = 0;
break;
default:
error = EOPNOTSUPP;
break;
}
return (error);
}
/*
* Define an error value precedence, and given two arguments, selects the
* value with the higher precedence.
*/
int
mac_error_select(int error1, int error2)
{
/* Certain decision-making errors take top priority. */
if (error1 == EDEADLK || error2 == EDEADLK)
return (EDEADLK);
/* Invalid arguments should be reported where possible. */
if (error1 == EINVAL || error2 == EINVAL)
return (EINVAL);
/* Precedence goes to "visibility", with both process and file. */
if (error1 == ESRCH || error2 == ESRCH)
return (ESRCH);
if (error1 == ENOENT || error2 == ENOENT)
return (ENOENT);
/* Precedence goes to DAC/MAC protections. */
if (error1 == EACCES || error2 == EACCES)
return (EACCES);
/* Precedence goes to privilege. */
if (error1 == EPERM || error2 == EPERM)
return (EPERM);
/* Precedence goes to error over success; otherwise, arbitrary. */
if (error1 != 0)
return (error1);
return (error2);
}
int
mac_check_structmac_consistent(struct mac *mac)
{
if (mac->m_buflen < 0 ||
mac->m_buflen > MAC_MAX_LABEL_BUF_LEN)
return (EINVAL);
return (0);
}
SYSINIT(mac, SI_SUB_MAC, SI_ORDER_FIRST, mac_init, NULL);
SYSINIT(mac_late, SI_SUB_MAC_LATE, SI_ORDER_FIRST, mac_late_init, NULL);