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/*- * Copyright (c) 2008-2011 Robert N. M. Watson * Copyright (c) 2010-2011 Jonathan Anderson * All rights reserved. * * This software was developed at the University of Cambridge Computer * Laboratory with support from a grant from Google, Inc. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ /* * FreeBSD kernel capability facility. * * Two kernel features are implemented here: capability mode, a sandboxed mode * of execution for processes, and capabilities, a refinement on file * descriptors that allows fine-grained control over operations on the file * descriptor. Collectively, these allow processes to run in the style of a * historic "capability system" in which they can use only resources * explicitly delegated to them. This model is enforced by restricting access * to global namespaces in capability mode. * * Capabilities wrap other file descriptor types, binding them to a constant * rights mask set when the capability is created. New capabilities may be * derived from existing capabilities, but only if they have the same or a * strict subset of the rights on the original capability. * * System calls permitted in capability mode are defined in capabilities.conf; * calls must be carefully audited for safety to ensure that they don't allow * escape from a sandbox. Some calls permit only a subset of operations in * capability mode -- for example, shm_open(2) is limited to creating * anonymous, rather than named, POSIX shared memory objects. */ #include "opt_capsicum.h" #include <sys/cdefs.h> __FBSDID("$FreeBSD: release/9.1.0/sys/kern/sys_capability.c 234037 2012-04-08 16:26:26Z pho $"); #include <sys/param.h> #include <sys/capability.h> #include <sys/file.h> #include <sys/filedesc.h> #include <sys/kernel.h> #include <sys/lock.h> #include <sys/mutex.h> #include <sys/proc.h> #include <sys/sysproto.h> #include <sys/sysctl.h> #include <sys/systm.h> #include <sys/ucred.h> #include <security/audit/audit.h> #include <vm/uma.h> #include <vm/vm.h> #ifdef CAPABILITY_MODE FEATURE(security_capability_mode, "Capsicum Capability Mode"); /* * System call to enter capability mode for the process. */ int sys_cap_enter(struct thread *td, struct cap_enter_args *uap) { struct ucred *newcred, *oldcred; struct proc *p; if (IN_CAPABILITY_MODE(td)) return (0); newcred = crget(); p = td->td_proc; PROC_LOCK(p); oldcred = p->p_ucred; crcopy(newcred, oldcred); newcred->cr_flags |= CRED_FLAG_CAPMODE; p->p_ucred = newcred; PROC_UNLOCK(p); crfree(oldcred); return (0); } /* * System call to query whether the process is in capability mode. */ int sys_cap_getmode(struct thread *td, struct cap_getmode_args *uap) { u_int i; i = (IN_CAPABILITY_MODE(td)) ? 1 : 0; return (copyout(&i, uap->modep, sizeof(i))); } #else /* !CAPABILITY_MODE */ int sys_cap_enter(struct thread *td, struct cap_enter_args *uap) { return (ENOSYS); } int sys_cap_getmode(struct thread *td, struct cap_getmode_args *uap) { return (ENOSYS); } #endif /* CAPABILITY_MODE */ #ifdef CAPABILITIES FEATURE(security_capabilities, "Capsicum Capabilities"); /* * struct capability describes a capability, and is hung off of its struct * file f_data field. cap_file and cap_rightss are static once hooked up, as * neither the object it references nor the rights it encapsulates are * permitted to change. */ struct capability { struct file *cap_object; /* Underlying object's file. */ struct file *cap_file; /* Back-pointer to cap's file. */ cap_rights_t cap_rights; /* Mask of rights on object. */ }; /* * Capabilities have a fileops vector, but in practice none should ever be * called except for fo_close, as the capability will normally not be * returned during a file descriptor lookup in the system call code. */ static fo_rdwr_t capability_read; static fo_rdwr_t capability_write; static fo_truncate_t capability_truncate; static fo_ioctl_t capability_ioctl; static fo_poll_t capability_poll; static fo_kqfilter_t capability_kqfilter; static fo_stat_t capability_stat; static fo_close_t capability_close; static fo_chmod_t capability_chmod; static fo_chown_t capability_chown; static struct fileops capability_ops = { .fo_read = capability_read, .fo_write = capability_write, .fo_truncate = capability_truncate, .fo_ioctl = capability_ioctl, .fo_poll = capability_poll, .fo_kqfilter = capability_kqfilter, .fo_stat = capability_stat, .fo_close = capability_close, .fo_chmod = capability_chmod, .fo_chown = capability_chown, .fo_flags = DFLAG_PASSABLE, }; static struct fileops capability_ops_unpassable = { .fo_read = capability_read, .fo_write = capability_write, .fo_truncate = capability_truncate, .fo_ioctl = capability_ioctl, .fo_poll = capability_poll, .fo_kqfilter = capability_kqfilter, .fo_stat = capability_stat, .fo_close = capability_close, .fo_chmod = capability_chmod, .fo_chown = capability_chown, .fo_flags = 0, }; static uma_zone_t capability_zone; static void capability_init(void *dummy __unused) { capability_zone = uma_zcreate("capability", sizeof(struct capability), NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, UMA_ALIGN_PTR, 0); if (capability_zone == NULL) panic("capability_init: capability_zone not initialized"); } SYSINIT(vfs, SI_SUB_VFS, SI_ORDER_ANY, capability_init, NULL); /* * Test whether a capability grants the requested rights. */ static int cap_check(struct capability *c, cap_rights_t rights) { if ((c->cap_rights | rights) != c->cap_rights) return (ENOTCAPABLE); return (0); } /* * Extract rights from a capability for monitoring purposes -- not for use in * any other way, as we want to keep all capability permission evaluation in * this one file. */ cap_rights_t cap_rights(struct file *fp_cap) { struct capability *c; KASSERT(fp_cap->f_type == DTYPE_CAPABILITY, ("cap_rights: !capability")); c = fp_cap->f_data; return (c->cap_rights); } /* * System call to create a new capability reference to either an existing * file object or an an existing capability. */ int sys_cap_new(struct thread *td, struct cap_new_args *uap) { int error, capfd; int fd = uap->fd; struct file *fp; cap_rights_t rights = uap->rights; AUDIT_ARG_FD(fd); AUDIT_ARG_RIGHTS(rights); error = fget(td, fd, rights, &fp); if (error) return (error); AUDIT_ARG_FILE(td->td_proc, fp); error = kern_capwrap(td, fp, rights, &capfd); /* * Release our reference to the file (kern_capwrap has held a reference * for the filedesc array). */ fdrop(fp, td); if (error == 0) td->td_retval[0] = capfd; return (error); } /* * System call to query the rights mask associated with a capability. */ int sys_cap_getrights(struct thread *td, struct cap_getrights_args *uap) { struct capability *cp; struct file *fp; int error; AUDIT_ARG_FD(uap->fd); error = fgetcap(td, uap->fd, &fp); if (error) return (error); cp = fp->f_data; error = copyout(&cp->cap_rights, uap->rightsp, sizeof(*uap->rightsp)); fdrop(fp, td); return (error); } /* * Create a capability to wrap around an existing file. */ int kern_capwrap(struct thread *td, struct file *fp, cap_rights_t rights, int *capfdp) { struct capability *cp, *cp_old; struct file *fp_object, *fcapp; int error; if ((rights | CAP_MASK_VALID) != CAP_MASK_VALID) return (EINVAL); /* * If a new capability is being derived from an existing capability, * then the new capability rights must be a subset of the existing * rights. */ if (fp->f_type == DTYPE_CAPABILITY) { cp_old = fp->f_data; if ((cp_old->cap_rights | rights) != cp_old->cap_rights) return (ENOTCAPABLE); } /* * Allocate a new file descriptor to hang the capability off of. */ error = falloc(td, &fcapp, capfdp, fp->f_flag); if (error) return (error); /* * Rather than nesting capabilities, directly reference the object an * existing capability references. There's nothing else interesting * to preserve for future use, as we've incorporated the previous * rights mask into the new one. This prevents us from having to * deal with capability chains. */ if (fp->f_type == DTYPE_CAPABILITY) fp_object = ((struct capability *)fp->f_data)->cap_object; else fp_object = fp; fhold(fp_object); cp = uma_zalloc(capability_zone, M_WAITOK | M_ZERO); cp->cap_rights = rights; cp->cap_object = fp_object; cp->cap_file = fcapp; if (fp->f_flag & DFLAG_PASSABLE) finit(fcapp, fp->f_flag, DTYPE_CAPABILITY, cp, &capability_ops); else finit(fcapp, fp->f_flag, DTYPE_CAPABILITY, cp, &capability_ops_unpassable); /* * Release our private reference (the proc filedesc still has one). */ fdrop(fcapp, td); return (0); } /* * Given a file descriptor, test it against a capability rights mask and then * return the file descriptor on which to actually perform the requested * operation. As long as the reference to fp_cap remains valid, the returned * pointer in *fp will remain valid, so no extra reference management is * required, and the caller should fdrop() fp_cap as normal when done with * both. */ int cap_funwrap(struct file *fp_cap, cap_rights_t rights, struct file **fpp) { struct capability *c; int error; if (fp_cap->f_type != DTYPE_CAPABILITY) { *fpp = fp_cap; return (0); } c = fp_cap->f_data; error = cap_check(c, rights); if (error) return (error); *fpp = c->cap_object; return (0); } /* * Slightly different routine for memory mapping file descriptors: unwrap the * capability and check CAP_MMAP, but also return a bitmask representing the * maximum mapping rights the capability allows on the object. */ int cap_funwrap_mmap(struct file *fp_cap, cap_rights_t rights, u_char *maxprotp, struct file **fpp) { struct capability *c; u_char maxprot; int error; if (fp_cap->f_type != DTYPE_CAPABILITY) { *fpp = fp_cap; *maxprotp = VM_PROT_ALL; return (0); } c = fp_cap->f_data; error = cap_check(c, rights | CAP_MMAP); if (error) return (error); *fpp = c->cap_object; maxprot = 0; if (c->cap_rights & CAP_READ) maxprot |= VM_PROT_READ; if (c->cap_rights & CAP_WRITE) maxprot |= VM_PROT_WRITE; if (c->cap_rights & CAP_MAPEXEC) maxprot |= VM_PROT_EXECUTE; *maxprotp = maxprot; return (0); } /* * When a capability is closed, simply drop the reference on the underlying * object and free the capability. fdrop() will handle the case where the * underlying object also needs to close, and the caller will have already * performed any object-specific lock or mqueue handling. */ static int capability_close(struct file *fp, struct thread *td) { struct capability *c; struct file *fp_object; KASSERT(fp->f_type == DTYPE_CAPABILITY, ("capability_close: !capability")); c = fp->f_data; fp->f_ops = &badfileops; fp->f_data = NULL; fp_object = c->cap_object; uma_zfree(capability_zone, c); return (fdrop(fp_object, td)); } /* * In general, file descriptor operations should never make it to the * capability, only the underlying file descriptor operation vector, so panic * if we do turn up here. */ static int capability_read(struct file *fp, struct uio *uio, struct ucred *active_cred, int flags, struct thread *td) { panic("capability_read"); } static int capability_write(struct file *fp, struct uio *uio, struct ucred *active_cred, int flags, struct thread *td) { panic("capability_write"); } static int capability_truncate(struct file *fp, off_t length, struct ucred *active_cred, struct thread *td) { panic("capability_truncate"); } static int capability_ioctl(struct file *fp, u_long com, void *data, struct ucred *active_cred, struct thread *td) { panic("capability_ioctl"); } static int capability_poll(struct file *fp, int events, struct ucred *active_cred, struct thread *td) { panic("capability_poll"); } static int capability_kqfilter(struct file *fp, struct knote *kn) { panic("capability_kqfilter"); } static int capability_stat(struct file *fp, struct stat *sb, struct ucred *active_cred, struct thread *td) { panic("capability_stat"); } int capability_chmod(struct file *fp, mode_t mode, struct ucred *active_cred, struct thread *td) { panic("capability_chmod"); } int capability_chown(struct file *fp, uid_t uid, gid_t gid, struct ucred *active_cred, struct thread *td) { panic("capability_chown"); } #else /* !CAPABILITIES */ /* * Stub Capability functions for when options CAPABILITIES isn't compiled * into the kernel. */ int sys_cap_new(struct thread *td, struct cap_new_args *uap) { return (ENOSYS); } int sys_cap_getrights(struct thread *td, struct cap_getrights_args *uap) { return (ENOSYS); } int cap_funwrap(struct file *fp_cap, cap_rights_t rights, struct file **fpp) { KASSERT(fp_cap->f_type != DTYPE_CAPABILITY, ("cap_funwrap: saw capability")); *fpp = fp_cap; return (0); } int cap_funwrap_mmap(struct file *fp_cap, cap_rights_t rights, u_char *maxprotp, struct file **fpp) { KASSERT(fp_cap->f_type != DTYPE_CAPABILITY, ("cap_funwrap_mmap: saw capability")); *fpp = fp_cap; *maxprotp = VM_PROT_ALL; return (0); } #endif /* CAPABILITIES */