Current Path : /usr/src/crypto/openssh/ |
FreeBSD hs32.drive.ne.jp 9.1-RELEASE FreeBSD 9.1-RELEASE #1: Wed Jan 14 12:18:08 JST 2015 root@hs32.drive.ne.jp:/sys/amd64/compile/hs32 amd64 |
Current File : //usr/src/crypto/openssh/deattack.c |
/* $OpenBSD: deattack.c,v 1.30 2006/09/16 19:53:37 djm Exp $ */ /* * Cryptographic attack detector for ssh - source code * * Copyright (c) 1998 CORE SDI S.A., Buenos Aires, Argentina. * * All rights reserved. Redistribution and use in source and binary * forms, with or without modification, are permitted provided that * this copyright notice is retained. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED * WARRANTIES ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL CORE SDI S.A. BE * LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY OR * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES RESULTING FROM THE USE OR MISUSE OF THIS * SOFTWARE. * * Ariel Futoransky <futo@core-sdi.com> * <http://www.core-sdi.com> */ #include "includes.h" #include <sys/types.h> #include <string.h> #include <stdio.h> #include <stdarg.h> #include "xmalloc.h" #include "deattack.h" #include "log.h" #include "crc32.h" #include "misc.h" /* * CRC attack detection has a worst-case behaviour that is O(N^3) over * the number of identical blocks in a packet. This behaviour can be * exploited to create a limited denial of service attack. * * However, because we are dealing with encrypted data, identical * blocks should only occur every 2^35 maximally-sized packets or so. * Consequently, we can detect this DoS by looking for identical blocks * in a packet. * * The parameter below determines how many identical blocks we will * accept in a single packet, trading off between attack detection and * likelihood of terminating a legitimate connection. A value of 32 * corresponds to an average of 2^40 messages before an attack is * misdetected */ #define MAX_IDENTICAL 32 /* SSH Constants */ #define SSH_MAXBLOCKS (32 * 1024) #define SSH_BLOCKSIZE (8) /* Hashing constants */ #define HASH_MINSIZE (8 * 1024) #define HASH_ENTRYSIZE (2) #define HASH_FACTOR(x) ((x)*3/2) #define HASH_UNUSEDCHAR (0xff) #define HASH_UNUSED (0xffff) #define HASH_IV (0xfffe) #define HASH_MINBLOCKS (7*SSH_BLOCKSIZE) /* Hash function (Input keys are cipher results) */ #define HASH(x) get_u32(x) #define CMP(a, b) (memcmp(a, b, SSH_BLOCKSIZE)) static void crc_update(u_int32_t *a, u_int32_t b) { b ^= *a; *a = ssh_crc32((u_char *)&b, sizeof(b)); } /* detect if a block is used in a particular pattern */ static int check_crc(u_char *S, u_char *buf, u_int32_t len) { u_int32_t crc; u_char *c; crc = 0; for (c = buf; c < buf + len; c += SSH_BLOCKSIZE) { if (!CMP(S, c)) { crc_update(&crc, 1); crc_update(&crc, 0); } else { crc_update(&crc, 0); crc_update(&crc, 0); } } return (crc == 0); } /* Detect a crc32 compensation attack on a packet */ int detect_attack(u_char *buf, u_int32_t len) { static u_int16_t *h = (u_int16_t *) NULL; static u_int32_t n = HASH_MINSIZE / HASH_ENTRYSIZE; u_int32_t i, j; u_int32_t l, same; u_char *c; u_char *d; if (len > (SSH_MAXBLOCKS * SSH_BLOCKSIZE) || len % SSH_BLOCKSIZE != 0) { fatal("detect_attack: bad length %d", len); } for (l = n; l < HASH_FACTOR(len / SSH_BLOCKSIZE); l = l << 2) ; if (h == NULL) { debug("Installing crc compensation attack detector."); h = (u_int16_t *) xcalloc(l, HASH_ENTRYSIZE); n = l; } else { if (l > n) { h = (u_int16_t *)xrealloc(h, l, HASH_ENTRYSIZE); n = l; } } if (len <= HASH_MINBLOCKS) { for (c = buf; c < buf + len; c += SSH_BLOCKSIZE) { for (d = buf; d < c; d += SSH_BLOCKSIZE) { if (!CMP(c, d)) { if ((check_crc(c, buf, len))) return (DEATTACK_DETECTED); else break; } } } return (DEATTACK_OK); } memset(h, HASH_UNUSEDCHAR, n * HASH_ENTRYSIZE); for (c = buf, same = j = 0; c < (buf + len); c += SSH_BLOCKSIZE, j++) { for (i = HASH(c) & (n - 1); h[i] != HASH_UNUSED; i = (i + 1) & (n - 1)) { if (!CMP(c, buf + h[i] * SSH_BLOCKSIZE)) { if (++same > MAX_IDENTICAL) return (DEATTACK_DOS_DETECTED); if (check_crc(c, buf, len)) return (DEATTACK_DETECTED); else break; } } h[i] = j; } return (DEATTACK_OK); }